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A B S T R A C T
Pricing and inventory distribution strategy in a multi-period supply chain environment has not yet been com-
prehensively explored. We derive closed-form solutions for both two-and three-echelon supply chains under a
manufacturer-stackelberg game framework where the supply chain members execute integrated procurement
planning by taking account upto four consecutive selling periods. Optimal pricing and inventory distribution
policy is identified in the perspective of each member among three pragmatic procurement scenarios. Our results
demonstrate that both integrated procurement strategies outperform conventional single-period decision and
reduce double-marginalization effect. But, the retailer can prefer bulk procurement to earn maximum profit. The
distributor acts as a catalyst, prevents the retailer from executing integrated multi-period procurement planning
and creates conflict among supply chain members. Procurement decisions in presence of strategic inventory may
lead to suboptimal profits compared to bulk procurement and supply chain members can face some im-
plementation issues. Supply chain members always receive higher profits if the retailer distributes inventory
strategically in a multi-period supply chain.
1. Introduction and Literature Review
Systematic procurement and inventory management create the in-
terfaces of efficient retail supply chains. Efficient inventory manage-
ment helps to reduce transportation costs, ensures continuity of selling
activities, and evades variations in wholesale price and demand. In
contrast, an effective procurement strategy ensures to maximize return
on investment. For example, [10] found that inventories need to place
downstream in the supply chain, especially when the demand un-
certainty is high. Inventory can be used to minimize the expected time
at the retail store and reduces the expected number of backorders [34].
It is well established in operations management literature that effective
pricing, procurement and inventory decisions are never-ending re-
search issue [4,14,15,23,24,28,33,35,38,39,41]. We refer the recent
review of [8,22,29] for more detail discussions on the importance of
inventory on retail operations and a supply chain environment.
However, [21] explored an alluring correlation between procure-
ment and inventory management in a two-period procurement setting.
The authors noted that the manufacturer’s second-period wholesale
price decreases proportionally with the amount of products the retailer
carries from the first period. [2] also noted similar evidence and stated
that the retailer can force the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale
price of forthcoming periods by maintaining products as inventory in
between two consecutive selling periods. The authors call it as Strategic
Inventory(SI). [6] proved that the manufacturer may introduce con-
sumer rebates to curtail strategic advantage of the retailer in building
SI, although both supply chain members can receive more profits in
presence of SI. [1] also reported that strategic use of inventory is
practiced in real world. [5] highlighted the benefits of SI in a single
manufacturer and multiple retailers supply chain. [18] conducted em-
pirical investigation to explore the effect of SI and found that the re-
tailer can immensely induce differentiated wholesale pricing behavior
by building up SI. [26] analyzed the impact of SI from the perspective
of supply chain coordination. They found that the optimal supply chain
profit cannot be achieved by implementing a quadratic quantity dis-
count contract mechanism. [13] proved that the retailer’s decision to
maintain SI can improve the greening level for the product. [16] also
suggested that the retailer should withhold SI to receive higher profits.
[12] showed that the manufacturer’s decision to produce development
or marginal-cost intensive product is also correlated with the retailer’s
decision in maintaining SI. The literature cited above acknowledges the
benefits of SI by analyzing outcomes of two-consecutive selling periods
only. Therefore, the supremacy of SI is required to scrutinize by con-
sidering more number of consecutive selling periods within an in-
tegrated procurement planning. In this study, the outcomes of two in-
tegrated procurement decisions in presence of inventory are explored
by considering upto four consecutive selling periods in the perspective
of improving profits of each participating member in a supply chain.
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This study demonstrates that procurement decision in the presence
of SI or conventional single-period procurement, where the retailer
procures products to satisfy demand in each selling period may not be
an optimal procurement strategy. We analyze the impact of a new
procurement strategy mixed with inventory distribution, and find that
an appropriate combination of pricing-inventory distribution strategy
can lead to a higher profit for every member. We call it procurement
Scenario BP (bulk procurement). The concept of large-volume pro-
curement arrangements is practiced among small retailer in country
such as Chile, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines due to rapid super-
market expansion in Latin America and Asia [9,31]. Additionally, in-
ventories in between two consecutive selling periods can serve as buf-
fers for responding to demand shocks. Unlike the procurement scenario
where the retailer maintains SI and determines the retail price and how
much additional products to be carried forwarded, the retailer needs to
decide the volume of additional products to be procured in first selling
period and formulate an optimal distribution planning of those pro-
ducts in forthcoming selling periods. We consider both two and three-
echelon supply chains to identify the influence of distributor also. The
consequence of associated pricing behaviour is also discussed. Results
are compared with procurement Scenario SPI, which is similar to
[2,13,18], where the retailer can maintain SI in between two con-
secutive selling periods. Therefore, in each selling period, the retailer
decides the price and the amount of product to be carried forward as SI
to enforce the upstream member to reduce wholesale price in forth-
coming selling periods. We prove that the former can outperform later.
Third procurement Scenario BM is similar to the conventional single-
period decision model. It is found that the single-period procurement
decision always leads to a suboptimal solution. The supply chain
members and consumers can receive higher benefits if the retailer can
mix procurement, pricing, and inventory management decision sys-
tematically. Supply chain members can be able to sell a higher amount
of products.
2. Problem description
We explore the interactions in two-and three-echelon supply chains
under linear price-sensitive [18] demand. Therefore, the demand for
each selling period is a bp ,r where a , b and pr represent market po-
tential, price sensitivity, and retail price, respectively. Linear price-
sensitive demand is one of the fundamental demand functions studied
in literature.
We derive optimal decisions where the supply chain member can
execute integrated procurement planning by taking account upto four
consecutive selling periods. Good procurement strategy is essential to
reduce total purchasing cost. In a recent study by [7], the author
mentioned that “even modest improvements in procurement policies
can provide enormous savings” by comparing two different procure-
ment models formulated under large-scale integer programming for-
mulation. The procurement Scenario BM is similar to conventional
single-period decision making model where impact of inventory is ig-
nored. In procurement Scenario BP, the retailer procures in bulk at first
Fig. 1. a. Procurement Scenario BP under two-echelon supply chain under four-period integrated planning; b. Procurement Scenario SPI under two-echelon supply
chain under four-period integrated planning.
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selling period and distributes those products in forthcoming selling
periods associated with the integrated planning. For example, in a
three-period integrated procurement planning, the supply chain mem-
bers need to set their respective prices for three consecutive selling
periods, and in addition, the retailer needs to make an inventory dis-
tribution planning for those three periods. Where as in procurement
Scenario SPI, the retailer needs to develop an inventory distribution
planning for two consecutive selling periods. We explore optimal de-
cisions under manufacturer-Stackelberg game model.
The retailer in the supply chain has a downstream retail monopoly
and relies solely on the upstream manufacturer in a two-echelon setting
or distributor and manufacturer in a three-echelon setting for the re-
tailed product. For feasibility of the optimal solution, it is assumed that
the retail (pr) and wholesale prices (pm and pd) at each selling period
satisfy the relations pr> pd> pm>0. The holding cost per unit for the
retailer is h.
For analytical simplicity, the marginal costs are normalized to zero
and all the parameters related to market demand are common knowl-
edge between supply chain members. Shortages are not allowed. It is
assumed that a>4hb. Otherwise, the retailer cannot buildup SI [5,18].
To distinguish the outcomes in different scenarios, the following addi-
tional subscripts and superscripts are used.
The following notations are used to develop the models:
i number of echelon (distribution structures), =i 2, 3
j procurement scenarios, =j bm bp spi, ,
t number of consecutive selling periods to be taken account in a
integrated procurement planning, =t 1, 2, 3, 4
s sth selling period under integrated procurement planning t, s t t,
pmts
ij wholesale price per unit determined by the manufacturer
pdts
ij wholesale price per unit determined by the distributor
prts
ij retail price per unit determined by the retailer
It s
ij
( 1) amount of SI (I 0t s
ij
( 1) )
mts
ij profit of the manufacturer
dts
ij profit of the distributor
rts
ij profit of the retailer
Qt
ij cumulative sales volume under tth procurement planning
2.1. Benchmark model
To establish the necessity of multi-period integrated procurement
strategies, we consider a conventional single-period procurement de-
cision model as a benchmark. In procurement Scenario BM, the retailer
does not maintain SI or procure products in bulk. Therefore, profit
functions of the retailer and manufacturer will be identical for each
selling period and their values are = p p a bp( )( )r bm r
bm
m
bm
r
bm
11
2
11
2
11
2
11
2 and
= p a bp( ),mbm m
bm
r
bm
11
2
11
2
11
2 respectively. One may obtain the optimal re-
sponse function for the retailer by solving first-order condition of op-
timization as = +p p( )r
bm
m
bm a bp
b11
2
11
2
2
m
bm
11
2
. Substituting optimal response, the
manufacturer’s profit function is obtained as follows,
=mbm
p a bp
11
2 ( )
2
m
bm
m
bm
11
2
11
2
and corresponding optimal wholesale price is
=pm
bm a
b11
2
2 . Therefore, profits for the retailer and manufacturer, and
sales volume in each selling period are obtained as, = ,r bm
a
b11
2
16
2
= ,mbm
a
b11
2
8
2
and =Q ,bm a12 4 respectively. Similarly, profit functions for a
single-period three-echelon supply chain consisting of a Stackelberg-
manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer are
= p p a bp( )( ),r bm r
bm
d
bm
r
bm
11
3
11
3
11
3
11
3 = p p a bp( )( ),d bm d
bm
m
bm
r
bm
11
3
11
3
11
3
11
3 and
= p a bp( ),mbm m
bm
r
bm
11
3
11
3
11
3 respectively. The corresponding optimal prices
and sales volume are =p ,r
bm a
b11
3 7
8 =p ,d
bm a
b11
3 3
4 =p ,m
bm a
b11
3
2 and =Q
bm a
1
3
8
respectively. Using optimal prices, profits of the manufacturer, dis-
tributor, and retailer are obtained as = ,mbm
a
b11
3
16
2
= ,d bm
a
b11
3
32
2
and
= ,r bm
a
b11
3
64
2
respectively.
2.2. Optimal decisions in Scenario BP
We derive optimal decision for a four-period integrated procure-
ment planning of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a
Stackelberg manufacturer and a retailer. In first selling period, the
manufacturer determines wholesale price (pm
bp
41
2 ). Based on the manu-
facturer’s decisions, the retailer sets retail price (pr
bp
41
2 ) and decides the
amount of inventory to be distributed in forthcoming periods
(I 0,s
bp
4( 1)
2 =s 2, 3, 4). Therefore, the retailer procures
= + =q a bp I
bp
r
bp
s s
bp
41
2
41
2
2
4
4( 1)
2 units of product from the manufacturer.
In forthcoming selling periods, the manufacturer sets the wholesale
price (pm s
bp
4
2 ), and then retailer sets the retail price (pr s
bp
4
2 ), ( =s 2, 3, 4).
Therefore, the retailer procures ( = =q a bp I s)( 2, 3, 4s
bp
r s
bp
s
bp
4
2
4
2
4( 1)
2 )
units of product in forthcoming periods and needs to invest more in first
period. We use a backward substitution method to find an optimal
decision. The profit functions for the supply chain members in four
consecutive selling periods are obtained as follows:
= +
+
= =p a bp p a bp I h I( ) ( )r
bp
r
bp
r
bp
m
bp
r
bp
s s
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4
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The graphical representation of procurement Scenario BP under
four-period planning is presented in Fig. 1a.
Table 1
Optimal decisions for two-echelon supply chain in procurement Scenarios BP.
Two-period (t=2) Three-period (t=3) Four-period (t=4)
pmt
bp
4
2 - - +a bh
b
12 58
33
pmt
bp
3
2 - +a bh
b
54 176
150
+a bh
b
12 36
33
pmt
bp
2
2 +a bh
b
6 10
17
+a bh
b
54 76
150
+a bh
b
12 14
33
pmt
bp
1
2 a bh
b
9 2
17
a bh
b
81 36
150
a bh
b
18 12
33
prt
bp
4
2 - - +a bh
b
45 58
66
prt
bp
3
2 - +a hb
b
204 176
300
+a bh
b
45 36
66
prt
bp
2
2 +a bh
b
23 10
34
+a bh
b
204 76
300
+a bh
b
45 14
66
prt
bp
1
2 a bh
b
26 2
34
a bh
b
231 36
300
a bh
b
51 12
66
It
bp
3
2 - - a bh9 116
66
It
bp
2
2 - a bh21 176
150
a bh9 72
66
It
bp
1
2 a bh5( 4 )
34
a bh21 76
150
a bh9 28
66
rt
bp
4
2 - - a abh b h
b
219 2 1392 3364 2 2
1452
mt
bp
4
2 - - +a bh
b
2(6 29 )2
1089
rt
bp
3
2 - a abh b h
b
573 2 2376 3872 2 2
3750
a abh b h
b
219 2 1227 1054 2 2
726
mt
bp
3
2 - +a bh
b
(27 88 )2
11250
+ +a abh b h
b
2(72 2 564 1165 2 2)
1089
rt
bp
2
2 a abh b h
b
181 2 360 300 2 2
1156
a abh b h
b
1146 2 3927 194 2 2
3750
a bh a bh
b
(3 2 )(219 916 )
1452
mt
bp
2
2 +a bh
b
2(3 5 )2
289
+ +a abh b h
b
729 2 3402 4594 2 2
5625
+ +a abh b h
b
4(54 2 324 607 2 2)
1089
rt
bp
1
2 +a abh b h
b
155 2 118 304 2 2
1156
+a abh b h
b
6219 2 8928 37184 2 2
30000
+a abh b h
b
102 2 213 1226 2 2
363
mt
bp
1
2 +a abh b h
b
9 2 4 8 2 2
34
+a abh b h
b
729 2 648 2144 2 2
1800
+a abh b h
bb
2(27 2 36 166 2 2)
99
Qt
bp2 a bh19 8
34
a bh3(29 24 )
100
a bh13 16
11
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Therefore, the retailer needs to determine optimal retail price and
how much inventory to be distributed in forthcoming periods.
Consequently one needs to consider the recursive impact of inventory
distribution for finding optimal profit. The detail derivations are pro-
vided in Appendix A. Table 1 represents the simplified values of equi-
librium outcomes under different scenarios.
Similarly, we also derive optimal decisions for the three-echelon
supply chains under different scenarios. Profit functions are presented
in Appendix A, and the optimal outcomes are presented in Table 2. The
detail derivation of the optimal decisions are similar to the two-echelon
supply chain, and thus omitted.
We propose following propositions to explore the characteristics of
optimal decisions:
Proposition 1. In any of the multi-period procurement planning upto four-
period under Scenario BP:
(i) the retail and wholesale prices increase from the second selling period.
(ii) the amount of products distributed by the retailer decreases as the selling
period increases.
Proof. Please see Appendix B. □
Proposition 2. Irrespective of number of echelons, participating supply
chain members receive higher profits by executing integrated procurement
planning upto four consecutive periods in Scenario BP compared to BM if
> hab
0.138158 .
Proof. Please see Appendix C. □
Proposition 3. In the multi-period procurement planning under Scenario
BP:
(i) the average profits for the manufacturer and retailer increase under
integrated procurement strategy upto four-period if holding cost satisfies
> hab
0.027431 and > h,ab
0.035817 respectively.
(ii) the average profits for three-echelon supply chain members are not in-
creasing under integrated procurement strategy upto four-period.
Proof. Please see Appendix D. □
Proposition 4. In the multi-period procurement planning upto four
consecutive periods under Scenario BP:
(i) sales volumes under both two- and three-echelon supply chains are
Table 2
Optimal decisions for three-echelon supply chain in procurement Scenario BP.
Two-period (t=2) Three-period (t=3) Four-period (t=4)
pmt
bp
4
3 - +a bh
b
0.40967 1.07268
pmt
bp
3
3 - +a bh
b
0.36284 0.63757 +a bh
b
0.40967 0.53934
pmt
bp
2
3 +a bh
b
5452 4648
13423
+a bh
b
0.36284 0.10424 +a bh
b
0.40967 0.00601
pmt
bp
1
3 a bh
b
209297 95720
416113
a bh
b
0.86642 0.45474 a bh
b
0.50584 0.81034
pdt
bp
4
3 - - +a bh
b
0.61451 1.60902
pdt
bp
3
3 - +a bh
b
0.54426 0.95636 +a bh
b
0.61451 0.80902
pdt
bp
2
3 +a bh
b
8178 6972
13423
+a bh
b
0.54427 0.15636 +a bh
b
0.61451 0.00902
pdt
bp
1
3 a bh
b
20445 9416
26846
a bh
b
0.68033 0.80455 a bh
b
0.76813 0.98872
prt
bp
4
3 - - +a bh
b
0.80725 0.80451
prt
bp
3
3 - +a bh
b
0.77213 0.47818 +a bh
b
0.80725 0.40451
prt
bp
2
3 +a bh
b
21601 6972
26846
+a bh
b
0.77213 0.07818 +a bh
b
0.80725 0.00451
prt
bp
1
3 a bh
b
47291 9416
53692
a bh
b
0.84017 0.40227 a bh
b
0.88407 0.49436
It
bp
3
3 - - a bh0.09033 1.07268
It
bp
2
3 - a bh0.13716 0.63757 a bh0.09033 0.53935
It
bp
1
3 a bh2519 9296
26846
a bh0.13716 0.10424 a bh0.09033 0.00601
rt
bp
4
3 - - a abh b h
b
0.09266 2 0.82396 1.07873 2 2
dt
bp
4
3 - - + +a abh b h
b
0.02098 2 0.10986 0.14383 2 2
mt
bp
4
3 - - + +a abh b h
b
0.04196 2 0.21972 0.28766 2 2
rt
bp
3
3 - a abh b h
b
0.12657 2 0.43376 0.38109 2 2 a abh b h
b
0.18532 2 1.32858 0.27876 2 2
dt
bp
3
3 - + +a abh b h
b
0.01646 2 0.05784 0.05081 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.04196 2 0.07477 1.25287 2 2
mt
bp
3
3 - + +a abh b h
b
0.03291 2 0.11567 0.10163 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.08391 2 0.33019 0.36038 2 2
rt
bp
2
3 a abh b h
b
7(9815827 2 27150960 11573520 2 2)
720707716
+a abh b h
b
0.25315 2 0.64184 0.24629 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.27798 2 1.51386 1.33323 2 2
dt
bp
2
3 +a bh
b
2(1363 1162 )2
180176929
+ +a abh b h
b
0.03291 2 0.06729 0.05217 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.062936 2 0.07538 1.25288 2 2
mt
bp
2
3 +a bh
b
4(1363 1162 )2
180176929
+ +a abh b h
b
0.06583 2 0.13458 0.10434 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.12587 2 0.33143 0.36039 2 2
rt
bp
1
3 +a abh b h
b
3542327 2 1776808 13313536 2 2
92994544
+a abh b h
b
0.09207 2 0.06218 0.55311 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.08326 2 0.15941 1.59587 2 2
dt
bp
1
3 +a abh b h
b
109133473 2 50085968 51338880 2 2
1441415432
+a abh b h
b
0.17236 2 0.73052 0.36506 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.16442 2 0.28836 1.45332 2 2
mt
bp
1
3 +a abh b h
b
247009 2 107600 115328 2 2
1664452
+a abh b h
b
0.44198 2 0.35703 0.25875 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.32159 2 0.55052 1.27096 2 2
Qt
bp3 a bh16891 4528
53692
a bh0.61557 0.15409 a bh0.69418 0.71917
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higher compared to Scenarios BM if > hab
0.125 .
(ii) average sales volumes in two-echelon supply chains will increase if
> h,ab
0.044117 however, in three-echelon supply chain sales volumes do
not increase.
Proof. Please see Appendix E. □
The graphical representation of wholesale and retail prices, the
profits for supply chain members are shown in Figs. 2a, b, c, d and 3 a,
b, c, d, e, f respectively. The following parameter values are used for
illustration: =a 200, =b 0.5, =h 5.
Above figures justify analytical findings. Pricing behaviors are not
effected by supply chain structures. In both two and three-echelon
supply chain, every member charges a higher price in first selling
period. However, prices decrease in second-period and then increase.
Due to bulk procurement and inventory distribution trend for the re-
tailer, the prices show such a pattern. The retailer needs to increase
retail prices as the number of selling periods increase from the second
period. In this way, the retailer can compensate increasing holding cost.
However, the most important observation from the above derivations is
that all the participants receive higher profits due to the businesslike
bulk procurement planning compared to single-period benchmark
procurement decision. However, the presence of an intermediary pre-
vents the retailer from executing an integrated bulk procurement de-
cision by taken account upto four consecutive selling periods. The re-
sults demonstrate that the average profits for all the supply chain
members decrease from the fourth selling period under three-echelon
supply chain. Although, the average profits for the retailer and manu-
facturer remain increasing under the two-echelon supply chain. The
presence of the distributor reduces the flexibility to earn higher profits.
Moreover, demand decreases with increasing retail price. Therefore, the
profits also decrease. Note that, the retailer utilizes the additional
products in second period and the distributed amount of products are
always higher from first period. Therefore, the profit earned in second
period is always high for the retailer. However, the procurement vo-
lumes decrease from the second period. Consequently, profits for the
manufacturer and distributor decrease. The trends of average sales
volumes and profits in three-echelon supply chain are also analogous.
2.3. Optimal decisions in Scenario SPI
At the beginning of each selling period ( =s 1, ,4) under in-
tegrated procurement planning upto four consecutive periods, the
manufacturer determines a wholesale price (pm s
spi
4
2 ) and posts it to the
retailer. The retailer then procures (Q sspi42 ) amounts of product and sets
retail price (pr s
spi
4
2 ) to satisfy market demand ( =q a bp s,s
spi
r s
spi
4
2
4
2 ). If
the purchased quantity at each period is larger than the quantity
sold in that period (i.e. >Q qsspi s
spi
4
2
4
2 ), then the retailer builds up
SI ( =I Q qs
spi
s
spi
s
spi
4( 1)
2
4
2
4
2 ) to be sold in the immediately following
period. The profit functions for the supply chain members
in procurement Scenario SPI are obtained as
follows: = + +p a bp p a bp I hI( ) ( )r spi r
spi
r
spi
m
spi
r
spi spi spi
r
spi
41
2
41
2
41
2
41
2
41
2
41
2
41
2
42
2
=mspi412 + +p a bp I( )m
spi
r
spi spi
m
spi
41
2
41
2
41
2
42
2
= + +p a bp p a bp I I hI( ) ( )r spi r
spi
r
spi
m
spi
r
spi spi spi spi
r
spi
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
42
2
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The graphical representation of procurement Scenario SPI under
four-period planning is presented in Fig. 1b.
Fig. 2. a. Wholesale prices in Scenario BP under two-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); b. Retail prices in Scenario
BP under two-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); c. Retailer’s profit in Scenario BP under two-echelon supply chain
Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); d. Manufacturer’s profit in Scenario BP under two-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-
period (Blue) Four-period (Black).
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Therefore, the retailer needs to decide how much additional pro-
ducts to be carried as a SI in between two consecutive selling periods. It
should be noted that optimal outcomes in Scenarios BP and SPI are
identical in two-period procurement planning. Table 3 represents the
simplified values of equilibrium outcomes for three and four-period
integrated procurement planning under both two and three-echelon
supply chains. The detail derivations for optimal decisions in two-
echelon supply chain and profit functions for three-echelon supply
chain are presented in Appendix F. Similar to Scenario BP, one needs to
consider the recursive impact to obtain optimal decision because the
retailer carries forward inventory from the present selling period to
immediate forthcoming period.
We propose the following propositions to explore the nature of
optimal decisions.
Proposition 5. In any of the multi-period procurement planning upto four
consecutive selling period under Scenario SPI:
(i) the retailer and manufacturer respectively set maximum retail and
wholesale prices in first selling period and prices decrease onwards.
(ii) the amount of SI decreases as the selling period increases.
Proof. Please see Appendix G. □
Proposition 6. Irrespective of number of echelon, participating supply
chain members receive higher profits by executing procurement planning
upto four consecutive periods in Scenario SPI compared to BM if
> hab
0.073661 .
Proof. Please see Appendix H. □
Proposition 7. In the multi-period procurement planning under Scenario
SPI:
(i) in two-echelon supply chain, the average profits for the manufacturer
and retailer for four consecutive selling periods are increasing if holding
cost satisfies > hab
0.056581 and > h,ab
0.03148 respectively.
(ii) in three-echelon supply chain, the average profits for supply chain
members are increasing if they execute integrated procurement planning
upto four consecutive periods.
Proof. Please see Appendix I. □
Proposition 8. In the multi-period integrated procurement planning upto
four-period under Scenario SPI:
(i) sales volumes under both two- and three-echelon supply chains are
higher compared to Scenario BM if > hab
0.144873
(ii) average sales volumes in two- and three supply chains are increasing if
> hab
0.084559 and > h,ab
0.24785 respectively.
Proof. Please see Appendix J. □
Fig. 3. a. Manufacturer’s prices in Scenario BP under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); b. Distributor’s prices
in Scenario BP under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); c. Retailer’s prices in Scenario BP under three-echelon
supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); d. Retailer’s profit in Scenario BP under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green)
Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); e. Distributor’s profit in Scenario BP under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period
(Black); f. Manufacturer’s profit in Scenario BP under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black).
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The graphical representation of the profits, wholesale and retail
prices in Scenario SPI, are shown in Figs. 4a, b, c, d and 5 a, b, c, d, e, f.
The parameter values remain unchanged.
Unlike the procurement Scenario BP, optimal results show different
characteristics. In both two and three-echelon supply chains, the prices
for the supply chain members demonstrate a sharp decreasing trend.
This result is consistent with the existing literature. The retailer’s
strategic decision to carry SI always enforces upstream members to
reduce wholesale prices [13,18]. However, average profits for all the
supply chain members remain higher compared to single-period pro-
curement planning models. The profits for the retailer in second-period
show sharp increments due to additional procurement in first period.
However, due to serial distribution of inventory, profits decreases but in
a steady pattern. Although the market demand increases with the de-
crement of retail price, but the profits do not increase continuously. The
presence of the distributor cannot prevent the retailer from preparing a
four-period profitable procurement planning. In Scenario BP, the
average profits for the three-echelon supply chain members demon-
strate decreasing trend. However, if the holding cost for the retailer is
not large enough then the retailer can execute a four-period integrated
procurement planning to obtain higher profits.
3. Managerial Implications
A growing number of researchers formulate supply chain models to
explore the influence of inventory [11]. In this study, we explore the
correlation between procurement and inventory carrying decisions.
Procurement strategies discussed in this study can be implemented in
practice because the profits of the supply chain members are always
higher compared to single-period procurement decisions. However,
pricing strategy for the retailer in Scenario SPI is consistent with a price
skimming strategy; the retailer charges higher initial price and lowers it
over forthcoming selling periods, suitable for consumer electronics
products. In contrast, the pricing strategy in Scenario BP is consistent
with a mix of skimming and penetration pricing strategy, which is
practiced in FMCG products extensively. We compare total profits of the
supply chain members under a three-period integrated procurement
planning and the profit differences are obtained as follows:
= >+ 0r bp r spi
a abh b h
b31
2
31
2 634791 1695192 8466176
8670000
2 2 2
= >+ 0mbp mspi
a abh b h
b31
2
31
2 4293 7416 29248
30600
2 2 2
Table 3
Optimal decision in two and three-echelon supply chains in Scenario SPI.
Two-echelon (i=2) Three-echelon (i=3)
Three-period (t=3) Four-period (t=4) Three-period (t=3) Four-period (t=4)
pmt
ispi
4
- +a bh
b
0.20394 1.64584 - +a bh
b
0.28719 1.01973
pmt
ispi
3
+a bh
b
0.26359 1.14132 +a bh
b
0.30592 1.46876 +a bh
b
0.33845 0.68803 +a bh
b
0.35565 0.60395
pmt
ispi
2
+a bh
b
0.39539 0.71197 +a bh
b
0.42288 0.79505 +a bh
b
0.41912 0.19319 +a bh
b
0.42886 0.03777
pmt
ispi
1
a bh
b
0.54657 0.25109 a bh
b
0.55817 0.39554 a bh
b
0.50539 0.45753 a bh
b
0.50729 0.68431
pdt
ispi
4
- - - +a bh
b
0.43079 1.52957
pdt
ispi
3
- - +a bh
b
0.50768 1.03205 +a bh
b
0.53849 0.91199
pdt
ispi
2
- - +a bh
b
0.63459 0.29006 +a bh
b
0.65322 0.05087
pdt
ispi
1
- - a bh
b
0.76979 0.70357 a bh
b
0.77595 1.05867
prt
ispi
4
- +a bh
b
0.60197 0.82292 - +a bh
b
0.71539 0.76479
prt
ispi
3
+a bh
b
0.63179 0.57066 +a bh
b
0.65296 0.73438 +a bh
b
0.75384 0.51603 +a bh
b
0.76925 0.45599
prt
ispi
2
+a bh
b
0.69769 0.35599 +a bh
b
0.71144 0.39753 +a bh
b
0.81729 0.14503 +a bh
b
0.82661 0.02544
prt
ispi
1
a bh
b
0.77329 0.12555 a bh
b
0.77908 0.19777 a bh
b
0.88489 0.35178 a bh
b
0.88798 0.52933
It
ispi
3
- a bh0.29606 1.64584 - a bh0.21281 1.01973
It
ispi
2
a bh0.23641 1.14132 a bh0.42216 2.99655 a bh0.16155 0.68803 a bh0.29291 1.65808
It
ispi
1
a bh0.25315 1.56706 a bh0.33945 2.87103 a bh0.16672 0.84143 a bh0.22715 1.47007
rt
ispi
4
- a abh b h
b
0.21881 2 0.50349 2.03158 2 2 - a abh b h
b
0.17267 2 0.54912 0.97486 2 2
dt
ispi
4
- - - + +a abh b h
b
0.01031 2 0.07322 0.12998 2 2
mt
ispi
4
- +a bh
b
1.35442(0.12391 )2 - + +a abh b h
b
0.02062 2 0.14643 0.25996 2 2
rt
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0.19789 2 0.45127 0.97695 2 2 a abh b h
b
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b
0.14261 2 0.43662 0.44381 2 2 a abh b h
b
0.26906 2 1.24314 0.32937 2 2
dt
ispi
3
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rt
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0.29589 2 1.05932 0.01203 2 2 +a abh b h
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0.17927 2 0.74701 0.22077 2 2 +a abh b h
b
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dt
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- - + +a abh b h
b
0.05257 2 0.07722 0.05998 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.09151 2 0.10821 0.18336 2 2
mt
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2 + +a abh b h
b
0.14765 2 0.53174 0.70097 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.24539 2 0.92268 1.84379 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.10304 2 0.15424 0.11996 2 2 + +a abh b h
b
0.17676 2 0.21976 0.36203 2 2
rt
ispi
1 +a abh b h
b
0.20893 2 0.33547 1.17731 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.28545 2 0.71681 3.19862 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.06418 2 0.06772 0.59395 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.09246 2 0.15269 1.53287 2 2
dt
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1
- - +a abh b h
b
0.12709 2 0.12158 0.18045 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.18264 2 0.27152 0.53554 2 2
mt
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1 +a abh b h
b
0.40993 2 0.37664 1.06292 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.55817 2 0.79107 2.90115 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.24548 2 0.22217 0.34399 2 2 +a abh b h
b
0.34882 2 0.48956 1.00578 2 2
Qt
ispi a bh0.89722 0.80112 a bh1.25455 1.75706 a bh0.54397 0.30927 a bh0.80077 0.71687
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3
31
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Note that the profits of the supply chain members are identical in
two-period procurement scenarios. Additionally, average profits of the
supply chain members decrease in four-period procurement scenario,
this motivates us to keep the number of consecutive selling period upto
four and develops the models under integrated procurement planning.
One can observe that the supply chain members always receive higher
profits in Scenario BP under two-echelon supply chain. However, the
channel members may prefer Scenario SPI under three-echelon setting.
The graphical representation of the profits for the supply chain mem-
bers under two and three-echelon setting are shown in Figs. 6 and 7,
respectively. The following parameters values are used: =h 10, a∈ (50,
500), and b∈ (0, 2).
Above figures demonstrate that the optimal decision in Scenario BP
outperforms SPI for two-echelon supply chain. Retailer and manu-
facturer prefer Scenario SPI, not the distributor under three-echelon
supply chain. However, there are implementation issues related to the
two procurement policies. The supply chain members need to imply
dynamic pricing policy to receive higher profits.
The findings of this research indicate that the procurement planning
is creating a new bottleneck. The supply chain members are facing a
dilemma due to conventional versus integrative thinking. In the history of
operation research literature, an integrated production-inventory-dis-
tribution problem has been extensively studied to find outcomes in the
long run. [3,17,20,27,32,37]. If we look at pricing behavior, the supply
chain members need to decrease prices in Scenario SPI or increase in
Scenario BP. Moreover, optimal profits decrease progressively. One
cannot ignore the effect of price sensitivity for pragmatic planning,
because price sensitivity is a critical factor in retailing [19,36].
Therefore, we need to analyze in micro-level before considering number
of selling periods for those problems mainly formulated under mixed-
integer programming settings. The results demonstrate that, in the
presence of inventory, supply chain members can receive negative
profits if the number of consecutive selling period is large, although the
average profits remain high. The results also support rational decision
making, because different marketing tools are commonly employed to
maintain flow of products to earn profits in long run.
4. Summary and concluding remarks
Efficient procurement planning, strategic utilization of resource,
and smart marketing can be a fun yet challenging way to make profit.
Commonly, a convenience store retailer buys products from a manu-
facturer or distributor, and markets them to consumers and keeps a
reasonable amount of inventory to eradicate possibility of shortages.
This study explores the pricing and integrated procurement decisions in
two and three-echelon supply chains. Under linear price-sensitive de-
mand, two pragmatic integrated procurement strategies are analyzed to
explore multi-period interaction among supply chain members.
Recently, some researchers have discussed properties of two-period
supply chain models [25,42] to explore some pragmatic business fra-
meworks without considering impact of inventory. Comparative ana-
lysis among equilibrium outcomes from the perspective of profits of the
supply chain members demonstrate how the procurement decisions in
the presence of inventory are influencing the overall preference of
supply chain members.
Contribution of the study to existing literature are as follows: First,
two multi-period integrated procurement strategies discussed in this
research can help supply chain members to make a profitable pro-
curement planning, because both can outperform single period decision
model. Without considering impact of inventory, researchers have
Fig. 4. a. Wholesale prices in Scenario SPI under two-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Red); b. Retail prices in Scenario SPI
under two-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Red); c. Retailer’s profit in Scenario SPI under two-echelon supply chain Two-
period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); d. Manufacturer’s profit in Scenario SPI under two-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period
(Blue) Four-period (Black).
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suggested that two-period models are more efficient to obtain practical
decision; for example, electronic goods [30]; short-life-cycle products
[40]. Our study also demonstrates that a multi-period integrated pro-
curement decision always provides more robust decision. Second,
[2,18] reported that procurement planning in presence of SI is an op-
timal procurement strategy for the retailer. However, we proved that
the supply chain members can receive higher profits in procurement
Scenario BP. Moreover, the supply chain members needs to reduce the
wholesale and retail prices significantly in the presence of SI. Therefore,
supply chain members can face a serious implementation issue. Third,
the results suggest that the presence of the intermediary prevents the
retailer from accomplishing a profitable procurement planning. The
retailer’s decision to mix inventory distribution, pricing, and procure-
ment in a multi-period setting not only improves their own profits, but
also those of other members. However, the retailer needs to imply a
product distribution strategy based on product categories. For example,
price skimming is suitable for innovative electronic products or pro-
ducts which have a “status-indicating quality, which is associated with
the procurement Scenario SPI. Fourth, this study suggests that supply
chain members, especially the retailer needs to think about the mix of
demand-enhancing marketing tools such as rebate or sales effort, alone
with procurement and inventory distribution policy, in anticipating
profits at later selling periods. We need to revisit the outcomes of
production-distribution planning problem in presence of inventory and
determine the optimal number of consecutive selling periods to be
considered in an integrated procurement planning.
The present analysis can be extended to incorporate several im-
portant features. For the analytical tractability, we consider four
Fig. 5. a. Manufacturer’s prices in Scenario SPI under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Red); b. Distributor’s prices in
Scenario SPI under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Red); c. Retailer’s prices in Scenario SPI under three-echelon
supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Red); d. Retailer’s profit in Scenario SPI under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green)
Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black); e. Distributor’s profit in Scenario SPI under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period
(Black); f. Manufacturer’s profit in Scenario SPI under three-echelon supply chain Two-period (Green) Three-period (Blue) Four-period (Black).
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consecutive selling periods and linear price dependent demand. We
predict the characteristics of optimal decisions remained unchanged for
a greater number of consecutive selling periods. The proposed study can
be extended by considering the effect of reference-price in between two
consecutive selling periods. One can explore the outcomes of two pro-
curement decisions under retailer-Stackelberg or the Nash game or in-
troduce factors such as sales-effort, rebate, green-sensitivity in the de-
mand function.
Fig. 6. a. Retailer’s profit in two-echelon supply chain, Scenarios BP (Blue) and SPI (Black);b. Manufacturer’s profit in two-echelon supply chain Scenarios BP (Blue)
and SPI (Black).
Fig. 7. a. Retailer’s profit in three-echelon supply chain, Scenarios BP (Blue) and SPI (Black); b. Distributor’s profit in three-echelon supply chain Scenarios BP (Blue)
and SPI (Black); c. Manufacturer’s profit in three-echelon supply chain, Scenarios BP (Blue) and SPI (Black).
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Appendix A. Derivation of optimal decision in Scenario BP
The optimal solution for the retailer’s four-period optimization problem is obtained by solving = 0d
dp
r
bp
r
bp
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2
44
2 . On simplification, we have
= +pr
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2
2
m
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2
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dp
r
bp
r
bp
2
44
2
44
2 2
. The optimal solution for the manufacturer’s
four-period optimization is obtained by solving = 0d
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m
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m
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. One can observe that the wholesale price is a function of I ,bp432 therefore, we need to consider the
impact of forth-period profit function to obtain optimal decision in third selling period.
Substituting the optimal response obtained in fourth-period, the profit function for the retailer in third-period is obtained as follows:
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Substituting the optimal response obtained in third-period, the profit function for the retailer in second-period is obtained as follows:
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Substituting the optimal response obtained in second-period, the profit function for the retailer in first selling period is obtained as follows:
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In procurement Scenario BP, the profit function of the retailer is a function of I ,bp412 I ,bp422 I ,bp432 and p bp41
2 . Therefore, optimal solution for the retailer
in first-period optimization problem can be obtained by solving the following first order conditions simultaneously:
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We compute Hessian matrix (H2bp) as follows:
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Values of principal minors of Hessian matrix (H2bp) are = > 0
b4
27
4 2
; = < 0b3
9
2 ; = >3 02 ; and = <b2 0,1 respectively. Therefore, profit
function for the retailer is concave. Substituting the optimal response, the profit function for the manufacturer is obtained as
= +ap2mbp m
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18
m
bp
m
bp2
41
2
41
2 2
. Solving the first order condition, one can obtain the wholesale price as =pm
bp a bh
b41
2 2(3 2 )
11 . By using back
substitution, we obtain the optimal decision shown in Table 1. Similarly, we derive optimal decisions under three- and two-period integrated
procurement models.
The profit functions for the supply chain members in three-echelon structure are obtained as follows:
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
If the supply chain members execute integrated procurement planning for four consecutive selling periods then the retail and wholesale prices,
and amount of products distributed by the retailer, satisfy the following relations:
= > = = <p p p p p p0; 0r
bp
r
bp a bh
b r
bp
r
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r
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r
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41
2
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2 3 13
33 42
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= = >I I I I 0bp bp bp bp bh413 423 423 433
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15
Similarly, if the supply chain members execute integrated procurement planning for three consecutive selling periods then the retail and
wholesale prices, and amount of products distributed by the retailer, satisfy the following relations:
= > = < = >p p p p p p0; 0; 0;r
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b31
2
32
2 27 112
300 32
2
33
2
3 31
2
32
2 27 112
150
= < = >p p I I0; 0m
bp
m
bp h bp bp bh
32
2
33
2 2
3 31
2
32
2 2
3
= > = <p p p p0; 0r
bp
r
bp a bh
b r
bp
r
bp h
31
3
32
3 116775 824672
1716440 32
3
33
3 2
5
= > = <p p p p0; 0d
bp
d
bp a bh
b d
bp
r
bp h
31
3
32
3 116775 824672
858220 32
3
33
3 4
5
= > = < = >p p p p I I0; 0; 0m
bp
m
bp a bh
b m
bp
m
bp h bp bp bh
31
3
32
3 30468825 33821344
60504510 32
3
33
3 8
15 31
2
32
2 8
15
Finally, for procurement planning of two consecutive selling periods, the following relations are obtained:
= > = > = >p p p p p p0; 0; 0;r
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m
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b21
2
22
2 3( 4 )
34 21
2
22
2 3( 4 )
17 21
3
22
3 4089 23360
53692
= > = >p p p p0; 0d
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b m
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The above inequalities ensure proof.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
By comparing average profits for the manufacturer, we obtain following inequalities:
= = >+ +/4 0mbp mbm
a ahb b h
b
a bh b h
b41
2
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2 9 144 664
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792
2 2 2 2 2 2
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Similarly, the following relations ensure that the average profits for the distributor always greater compere to the profit earns in Scenario BM:
= >+/4 0d
bp
d
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Finally, the following relations ensure that the average profits for the retailer always greater compere to the profit earns in Scenario BM:
= >+/4 0r bp r bm
a abh b h
b41
2
11
2 45 852 4904
5808
2 2 2
= = >+ +/3 0r bp r bm
a abh b h
b
a bh bh a bh
b31
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11
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45000
297( 8 ) 32 (9 13 )
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= > > h/2 0 ifr bp r bm
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b
a
b21
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2 (21 152 )( 4 )
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21
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= >+/4 0r bp r bm
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b41
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= >+/2 0r bp r bm
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b21
3
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Note that a quadratic expression + +ax bx c2 can be written as + +( )a x ba ac ba2 2 4 4 2 . Therefore, if a and = ac b4 2 are both positive, then the
expression as a whole is positive. For example, the values of = ac b4 2 for the expressions /4 ,r bp r bm413 113 /3 ,r bp r bm313 113 /2r bp r bm213 113 are
39582674790400, 33992604694789171200, 122903077263104, respectively. Consequently, the expressions are considered as positive as a whole.
The above inequalities ensure proof.
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
By comparing average profits for the retailer, one can obtain the following inequalities:
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Similarly, by comparing average profits of the distributor, one can obtain the following inequalities:
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finally, by comparing average profits for the manufacturer, we obtain the following in-
equalities:
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Therefore, by combining the above, we obtain the feasible range of holding cost for the manufacturer.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
By comparing sales volumes in procurement Scenarios BP and BM, one can obtain the differences as follows:
= >Q Q/4 0bp bm a bh42 12
8
22
= >Q Q/3 0bp bm a bh32 12
6
25
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26846
Similarly, the differences among average sales volumes in procurement Scenarios BP and BM are obtained as follows:
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26846 The above inequalities ensure the proof.
Appendix F. Derivation of optimal decision in Scenario SPI
The optimal solution for the retailer in fourth-period optimization problem is obtained by solving = 0d
dp
r
spi
r
spi
44
2
44
2 . On simplification, =
+pr
spi a bp
b44
2
2
m
spi
44
2
.
The profit function of the retailer in fourth-period is concave because = <b2 0d
dp
r
spi
r
spi
2
44
2
44
2 2 . The optimal solution for the manufacturer in fourth-period
optimization problem is obtained by solving = 0d
dp
m
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m
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44
2
44
2 . On simplification, =pm
spi a I
b44
2 2
2
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43
2
. The profit function of the manufacturer in fourth period is
concave because = <b 0d
dp
m
spi
m
spi
2
44
2
44
2 2 .
Similarly, the profit function for the retailer in third-period is obtained as follows:
= + ++ p a bp a I I bp p hI( ) ( )r spi
a aI I
b r
spi
r
spi spi spi
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Corresponding optimal retail price and amount of SI are = +pr
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2
m
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2
and = +I ,spi a b h p432
3 4 ( )
6
m
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respectively. Substituting optimal response, the
profit function for the manufacturer in third-period is = + a I p( ) ,mspi
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and the corresponding wholesale price is
=pm
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2
. Note that the third period optimization problem for the retailer and manufacturer are concave because = <b2 0
p
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2
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The second-period profit function for the retailer is obtained as follows:
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Finally, the first-period profit function for the retailer is obtained as follows:
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In contrast to procurement Scenario BP, the retailer needs to determine price-inventory pair for each selling period. Although profit function of
each member depends of profit function of previous period. Corresponding optimal retail price and amount of SI are = +pr
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2
2
m
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2 . Substituting optimal response for the retailer, the profit function for the manufacturer in first-period is ob-
tained as follows:
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By using back substitution one may obtain the optimal decision shown in Table 3.
The profit functions for the supply chain members in three-echelon are obtained as follows:
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Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 5
If the supply chain members execute integrated procurement planning upto four consecutive selling periods, then the retail and wholesale prices,
and amount of SI, satisfy the following relations:
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If the supply chain members execute integrated procurement planning upto three consecutive selling periods, then the retail and wholesale
prices, and amount of SI, satisfy the following relations:
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The above inequalities ensure proof.
Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 6
The following relations ensure that the average profits of the manufacturer always greater compere to the profit earned by the manufacturer in
Scenario BM:
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Similarly, the following relations ensure that the average profits for the distributor always greater compere to the profit earned in Scenario BM:
= >+/4 0d
spi
d
bm a abh b h
b41
3
11
3 0.01441 0.06788 0.133892 2 2
= >+/3 0d
spi
d
bm a abh b h
b31
3
11
3 0.01111 0.04053 0.060152 2 2
= >+/2 0d
spi
d
bm a abh b h
b21
3
11
3 38090017 100171936 102677760
5765661728
2 2 2
Finally, the following relations ensure that the average profits for the retailer always greater compere to the profit earned in Scenario BM:
= > >+ h/4 0 ifr spi r bm
a abh b h
b
a
b41
2
11
2 0.00886 0.17921 0.79965 0.07366072 2 2
= > >+ h/3 0 ifr spi r bm
a abh b h
b
a
b31
2
11
2 0.00714 0.11182 0.39244 0.09670952 2 2
= > > h/2 0 ifr spi r bm
a bh a bh
b
a
b21
2
11
2 (21 152 )( 4 )
4624
0.138158
= >+/4 0r spi r bm
a abh b h
b41
3
11
3 0.00749 0.03817 0.383222 2 2
= >+/3 0r spi r bm
a abh b h
b31
3
11
3 0.00577 0.02257 0.197982 2 2
= >+/2 0r spi r bm
a abh b h
b21
3
11
3 1272495 3553616 26627072
371978176
2 2 2
The above inequalities ensure proof.
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 7
By comparing average profits of the retailer, we obtain the following inequalities:
= > >+ h/4 /3 0 ifr spi r spi
a abh b h
b
a
b41
2
31
2 0.00172 0.06738 0.40722 0.031482 2 2
= > >+ h/3 /2 0 ifr spi r spi
a abh b h
b
a
b31
2
21
2 0.00261 0.06078 0.26095
371660350911408
0.056542 2 2
= > > h/2 0 ifr spi r bm
a bh a bh
b
a
b21
2
11
2 (21 152 )( 4 )
4624
0.138158
= >+/4 /3 0r spi r spi
a abh b h
b41
3
31
3 0.00172 0.01558 0.185242 2 2
= >+/3 /2 0r spi r spi
a abh b h
b31
3
21
3 0.00235 0.01302 0.126412 2 2
= >+/2 0r spi r bm
a abh b h
b21
3
11
3 1272495 3553616 26627072
371978176
2 2 2
Similarly, by comparing average profits of the distributor and manufacturer, we obtain the following inequalities:
= >+/4 /3 0d
spi
d
spi a abh b h
b41
3
31
3 0.00329 0.02735 0.073732 2 2
= >+/3 /2 0d
spi
d
spi a abh b h
b31
3
21
3 0.00451 0.02315 0.042342 2 2
= >+/2 0d
spi
d
bm a abh b h
b21
3
11
3 38090017 100171936 102677760
5765661728
2 2 2
= > >+ h/4 /3 0 ifmspi mspi
a ahb b h
b
a
b41
2
31
2 0.00289 0.07222 0.37098 0.056582 2 2
= > >+ h/3 /2 0 ifmspi mspi
a abh b h
b
a
b31
2
21
2 859491 13368024 47414576
200347992
0.0991932 2 2
= >/2 0mspi mbm
a bh
b21
2
11
2 ( 4 )
136
2
= >+/4 /3 0mspi mspi
a abh b h
b41
3
31
3 0.00538 0.04833 0.136782 2 2
= >+/3 /2 0mspi mspi
a abh b h
b31
3
21
3 0.00762 0.04173 0.080022 2 2
= >+/2 0mspi mbm
a abh b h
b21
3
11
77905 215200 230656
6657808
2 2 2
Above inequalities ensure the proof.
Appendix J. Proof of Proposition 8
By comparing sales volume in Scenarios SPI and BM, the following inequalities are obtained:
= > >Q Q a bh h/4 0.06364 0.43927 0 ifspi bm ab4
2
1
2 0.144873
= > >Q Q a bh h/3 0.049074 0.26703 0 ifspi bm ab3
3
1
2 0.183774
= > >Q Q h/2 0 ifspi bm a bh ab2
2
1
2 4
34 4
= > >Q Q a bh h/4 0.07519 0.17923 0 ifspi bm ab4
4
1
3 0.419541
= > >Q Q a bh h/3 0.05632 0.10309 0 ifspi bm ab3
3
1
3 0.546332
I.E. Nielsen, S. Saha Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 383–398
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= > >Q Q h/2 0 ifspi bm a bh ab2
2
1
3 867 1132
26846
867
1132
Therefore, sales volume in Scenarios SPI will be greater compared to sales volume in BM if > hab
0.144873 . Similarly, the difference among average
sales volumes under different scenarios are:
= > >Q Q a bh h/4 /3 0.01456 0.17223 0 ifspi spi ab4
2
3
2 0.0845591
= > >Q Q a bh h/3 /2 0.01966 0.14939 0 ifspi spi ab3
2
2
2 0.131619
= > >Q Q h/2 0 ifbp bm a bh ab2 1
2 4
34 4
= > >Q Q a bh h/4 /3 0.01887 0.07613 0 ifspi spi ab4
3
3
3 0.24785
= > >Q Q a bh h/3 /2 0.02403 0.06092 0 ifspi spi ab3
3
2
3 0.394366
= > >Q Q h/2 0 ifspi bm a bh ab2
3
1
867 1132
26846
0.765901 The above inequalities ensure proof.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.orp.2018.11.003.
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